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RECENT CASES

indirection. Therefore, we view the alleged equality as superficial." 10
Notable also is that the case's disposition completely harmonizes
with the principle which has grown out of broad extensions of the
landmark Brown v. Board of Education1 ' decision. That principle
being that the fourteenth amendment ".. . requires a state, in all of its
official actions, to be indifferent to racial considerations . .. "12 The
invalidated Louisiana ordinance patently circumvented this principle
and the Court duly responded.
The Court is to be commended for not seeking refuge behind the
clever framework in which the statute was constructed. Instead, it
opened itself to a possible bitter attack by recognizing that the state,
in singling out the candidates' race, was irresponsibly abusing the
ballot to arouse the passion of bigotry; by recognizing that the state,
in exploiting one of its most treasured functions, was subtly encouraging the contemptible practice of block-voting; by unequivocally
declaring that "private attitudes and pressures" toward the Negro
at the time of its enactment could only result in that "repressive effect"
which "was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental
power."

13
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ADi~assmira.- The defendant signed a waiver which recited that he
consented to submit to a lie-detector test and agreed the results could
be introduced as evidence against him. The test was to be the standard polygraph test conducted by a qualified polygraph operator. He
knew the contents of the waiver as it was read to him but the evidence showed that he was illiterate and able to write only his name.
At the time of the waiver he did not have counsel, but he was apprised of his rights. On trial defendant objected to the admissibility
of the lie-detector results. He was overruled and convicted. Held:
Reversed. The results should have been excluded, notwithstanding
the waiver. Lie-detector results have not attained a sufficient degree
of scientific trustworthiness, and therefore the written agreement
was not binding. Conley v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 865 (Ky.
1964).
The results of lie-detector tests are inadmissible in evidence, at
l Anderson v. Martin, supra note 3, at 404.
11347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2
1 Wollett, supra note 7, at 92.
13 Anderson v. Martin, supra note 3, at 403.
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least in the absence of a written stipulation between the parties.'
2
Only three jurisdictions have expressly respected such an agreement,
and in the most recent of these cases, the court outlined certain welldefined qualifications which the stipulation must meet.3
There appears to be a trend in the direction of admitting liedetector results taken under stipulation, and at least one authority
feels that possibly a majority of jurisdictions would admit this evidence
under stipulation.4 Such belief is based on the fact that other jurisdictions,5 largely by implication, have shown increasing favorability
toward introducing this evidence, even where such evidence is excluded. Before the Conley case, Kentucky was numbered among these
jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals in Colbert v. Commonwealth,6
had intimated that under the proper circumstances it would admit
lie-detector results under a written stipulation. The court did not
ground its decision solely on the fact that the lie-detector had not
as yet attained scientific acceptance. There was an oral agreement
and no written stipulation as to the operator being a qualified
expert. The court said: "We think more formality should be required
to give effect to an agreement of such importance"7 which meant,
in effect, that the results were not admissible because the stipulation
was not binding.
'People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963); State v. Amwise, 67 N.J. Super, 483, 171 A.2d 124 (App. Div. 1962); Colbert v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d
172 (1951); Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2 California: People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1948); Iowa: State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568
(1960); Arizona: State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P. 2d 894 (1962).
8 State v. Valdez supra note 2, at 900; The Arizona court set out the following qualifications: (1) That county attorney, defendant, and his counsel all
sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission to the test and
for the subsequent admission at trial of the graphs and examiner's opinion on behalf of either defendant or state; (2) That notwithstanding the stipulation, the
admissibility of the test result is subject to discretion of trial judge, i.e. if the trial
judge is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence; (3) That
if the graphs and examiners opinion are offered in evidence the opposing party
shall have the right to cross-examine the examiner respecting: a. the examiners
qualifications and training; b. the conditions under which the test was administered; c. the limitations of and possibilities for error in the technique of polygraphic interrogation; and d. at the discretion of the trial judge any other matters deemed pertinent to the inquiry; (4) That if such evidence is admitted
the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not
tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is
charged, but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination
defendant was not telling the truth.
4Richardson, Modem Scientific Evidence 301, § 10.14, (1961).
GCommonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa. 610, 123 A.2d 735 (1956); State v.
Walker, 37 N.J. 208, 181 A.2d 1 (1962).
6 Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957).
7 Ibid.
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In the Conley case the decision was based squarely upon the lack
of reliability and scientific trustworthiness of lie-detector results.
In rather absolute language, the court said: "... since we are holding
lie-detector results inadmissible, the written agreement that such
might be introduced was not binding."8 The court cited three recent
decisions that determined lie-detector evidence was admissible pursuant to a written stipulation; 9 however, the court proceeded to discuss
the general merits of lie-detector results without further mention of
the stipulation in the case. Would the results have been changed if
the stipulation had complied with the qualifications as outlined in
State v. Valdez?10 It is doubtful, since the emphasis of the opinion
was not placed upon the required "formality" of a stipulation as set
out in the Colbert case. The absoluteness of the decision devitalized
the implication in Colbert. It would appear that the Conley case has
brought Kentucky in line with other jurisdictions which apply the
general rule that lie-detector results are inadmissible in all cases."
Experts have said that there seems to be no substantial reason why
an agreement and stipulation to admit lie-detector results in evidence
should not be upheld.' 2 Whenever the parties are willing to resort
to lie-detector tests the case is usually a doubtful one, and since there
is already a possibility that an incorrect decision may be reached,
it is argued that the test results would be more accurate than mere
guesswork on the part of the judge or jury.
The most logical argument for admissibility is that the court
should not restrict the freedom of the parties to alter the rules of
evidence. Since the parties have chosen to waive the rules of evidence, they should be allowed to do so as long as the stipulation does
not violate a rule of public policy. 13 The stipulation has become a tool
whereby statutory and constitutional rights, including the privilege of
self-incrimination may be waived. On the use of stipulations for the
admission of facts proved by evidence otherwise inadmissible, Wigmore has said:
Any other result would seem to be inconsistent with the general spirit
and practice of our litigation, which judicially leaves to the parties the
8 382 S.W.2d at 867.
9 California: People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (Dist.

Ct. App. 1948); Iowa: State -. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W. 2d 568

(1960); Arizona: State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P. 2d 894 (1962).
lu State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P. 2d 894, 900 (1962).

"1People v. Zazzetta, 27 IM. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963); State v.
Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P. 2d 788 (1961); Stone v. Earn, 331 Mich. 606, 50
N.W. 22d 172 (1951).
lInbau and Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 134 (3d ed.
1953).
13 A Wigmore, Evidence § 2592 (3d ed. 1940).
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framing of their pleadings and issues and determines no objection not
expressly raised by one of them. Moreover, the judicial refusal to recognize it [the stipulation] would often permit unseemly breaches of faith
by counsel who have signed the admission.14

Courts which have given effect to written waivers have been
criticized as according a "curing" effect to a stipulation. If such evidence would not have been admitted without a stipulation, could
the presence of a stipulation cure these defects? The Illinois court
answered no:
If such tests are as unpredictable and misleading as the courts are so
certain they are, then their reliability and usefulness to the court and
the
jury upon the ultimate question of guilt or innocence remains
same, regardless if they are admitted by stipulation or not. 15

Only after thoroughly examining the circumstances of a waiver
should a court pass upon the admissibility of lie-detector evidence
under a prior written stipulation. If the qualifications as set out
by the Arizona court are met, 6 it is submitted that courts should give
effect to the agreement.
Jerry P. Rhoads
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FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIs TENANT.- Appellants own land which is

surrounded on three sides by mountain property owned by the appellee. The appellee leased some of its land to be mined for coal
and the lessee adopted the method of strip mining. After the cessation
of the operations, the appellee did not restore the land to prevent
erosion along natural watercourses. As a result, its branches began to
be obstructed with rock, silt, and coal emanating from the strip mines
on the higher property. Later, heavy rains expedited this drainage
and sent further amounts of debris into these watercourses. At a point

where the streams unite on the land of the appellants, the streams
overflowed. The water washed over a portion of the appellants' land,
burying it under a thick cover of rock, dirt, and coal. It is alleged

that the appellee failed to exercise ordinary care and was guilty of
wanton, reckless, and wilful conduct. Punitive as well as compensatory damages were demanded. It was the position of the appellee
that the wrongful acts complained of were committed by its lessee
for which it was not liable. The trial court dismissed appellants'
14 Id. at 592.
189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1963).
15 People v. Zazzetta, 27 IM. 2d 302, -,
16 State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, -, 371 P. 2d 894, 900 (1962).

